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This article reviews the recent body of political theory scholarship on political parties 
and partisanship. It discusses, on the one hand, approaches that focus on partisanship as 
an associative practice, and on the other hand approaches that focus on the party as an 
institution. The article argues that, while the two approaches usefully complement each 
other, concentrating on partisanship at the expense of party risks paying insufficient at-
tention to the institutional structures that connect partisans to the state and allow them 
to exercise power. This is problematic, however, since it is especially parties as institu-
tions whose functionality tends to be doubted. The political theory of parties is incomplete 
without an agenda for party reform. 
 
 
Generally speaking, scholars working in the fields of political theory and philosophy are 
not especially interested in political parties (see Rosenblum 2008). In the anglophone 
analytic tradition of political philosophy, the major debates of the day continue to be de-
bates around different concepts, conceptualisations and applications of justice. These de-
bates tend to touch on broad and general moral problems and have relatively little to do 
with the ordinary business of elections, contestation, and mobilisation. But even in the 
comparatively smaller world of democratic theory, which tends to be much more inter-
ested in political practice, parties are widely shunned. As two observers noted in 2008, in 
an article tellingly called “Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars: Why They Don’t 
Talk to Each Other, and Why They Should,” “modern democratic theory is noticeably 
silent on the question whether political parties have a legitimate place and function in a 
democracy” (Biezen and Saward 2008, 22). 
Take the field of deliberative democracy. To cite just one striking example, the 
recently published Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (Bächtiger et al. 2018), 
which promises to represent the field in its full breadth, includes chapters on virtually all 
things one could possibly connect with the topic of deliberation except parties. Consider 
also recent theoretical work on representation. Here, the main concern appears to be with 
expanding the possibilities of representation and the signification of that term as broadly 
as possible, notably beyond elections, parties and traditional representative institutions 
(e.g., Rehfeld 2009; Rosanvallon 2008; Saward 2010; Näsström 2015; for a critique, see 
Schweber 2016). Or think of the burgeoning theoretical literature on the notion of civil 
disobedience and other practices of protest and disruption (e.g., Butler 2015; Celikates 
2016; Scheuerman 2016; Smith 2017). This work often sees parties as part of the problem 
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against which protest should be directed: the undemocratic establishment that is consid-
ered responsible for all sorts of democratic ills. The background intuition, in Kalyvas’s 
words (2008, 297, emphasis added), is that “phenomena such as civil disobedience, irreg-
ular and informal movements, … protests, insurgencies, street fighting, and illegal up-
heavals are as (if not more) important to democracy as normal politics.” This point is not 
just descriptive, but normative: the party form is often seen as inferior to more spontane-
ous, non-institutionalised forms of political agency (for an overview and critique, see 
Dean 2016). 
This latter body of literature points to a potential reason for why political parties 
are widely considered unworthy of theoretical attention: together with representative de-
mocracy at large, parties are widely thought to have become dysfunctional. As Peter Mair 
(2013, 1) framed the concern, parties have “become so disconnected from the wider so-
ciety, and pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer 
seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form” (also see Ignazi 2017). Thus, 
the impulse to theorise about anything and everything but parties may be seen as respond-
ing to a critical analysis of existing representative-political institutions, one that regards 
party democracy as broken, and infers from this a need to search for alternative ways to 
exercise democratic agency in representative, participatory, etc. ways, over and above 
“normal politics.” 
In part as a reaction to this, a small but growing body of literature in political 
theory seeks to illuminate why parties were ever thought to be desirable in the first place, 
and why there is still good reason to think that parties and partisanship provide indispen-
sable forms of democratic agency. Since the mid-2000s, theorists such as Nancy Rosen-
blum (2008), Russell Muirhead (2014), Jonathan White and Lea Ypi (2016), and Matteo 
Bonotti (2017) have developed novel theoretical accounts of party that seek to re-estab-
lish the latter firmly as a subject of political theory and philosophy. Their defences un-
derline in distinctive fashion what parties add to democracy, and why party-less democ-
racy is ultimately a spurious idea. 
This new political theory of parties proves to be the exception to the otherwise 
general rule that political theorists neglect parties. In this article, I want to offer a critical 
review of the key theoretical arguments in this emerging research field. I begin by running 
through the just-mentioned work of Rosenblum, Muirhead, White and Ypi, and Bonotti. 
These are arguably the most rigorous and influential theoretical studies on the topic of 
parties that have been conducted so far. While they differ in many respects, what unites 
the four books in question is their strong focus on partisanship as an associative practice, 
at the expense of party as an institutional form. In a second step, I shift perspective and 
look at work that takes the opposite tack, privileging the party over practices of partisan-
ship. Examining this scholarship, I suggest that there are good empirical reasons for fo-
cusing less on partisanship and more on parties, which has to do with the institutional 
transformation parties have undergone over the past forty years or so – a transformation 
that reinforces and stabilises the widely-lamented disconnect between parties and their 
constituents (cf. Biezen and Saward 2008).
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The recent revival of party theory 
 
As I have already indicated, the “new” political theory of parties is still a relatively small 
and emerging field. It began with a number of articles published in the 2000s, in which a 
number of prominent theorists – spearheaded by Nancy Rosenblum – tried to connect the 
topic of parties and partisanship to distinctively normative concerns in democratic theory 
and political theory more generally (e.g., Rosenblum 2000; Muirhead 2006; White and 
Ypi 2010). 
In what follows, I want to run through these authors’ later, more developed works, 
notably Rosenblum’s major 2008 book On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of 
Parties and Partisanship, Muirhead’s 2014 book The Promise of Party in a Polarized 
Age and White and Ypi’s 2016 book The Meaning of Partisanship. I will also discuss the 
most recent like-minded contribution, Matteo Bonotti’s 2017 work Partisanship and Po-
litical Liberalism in Diverse Societies. I selected these four books because they are the 
main recent English-language treatises on the topic and are widely seen as forming the 
backbone of the new party literature in political theory.1 In a later section I also engage 
with even more recent work, notably Jodi Dean’s Crowds and Party (2016) and Frances 
Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro’s Responsible Parties (2018). 
 
 
Between democratic realism and history of political thought: Rosenblum and 
Muirhead 
 
Beginning with Rosenblum’s ambitious and wide-ranging On the Side of the Angels, this 
consists of an intellectual history of what Rosenblum calls “antipartyism,” as well as a 
positive argument for the “moral distinctiveness” of party identification. Perhaps most 
relevantly, the historical part of the book shows with utmost clarity why major modern 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau deemed parties a danger to the common good: 
those philosophers tended to conceive the political community as a unified whole, with 
only one (clearly identifiable) common good. By implication, anyone proposing different 
interpretations of the common good – as parties typically do – is a threat to the stability 
if not the survival of the political community.  
As Rosenblum persuasively shows, this way of thinking about politics also makes 
itself visible in contemporary phenomena such as authoritarian one-partyism (think of the 
Chinese Communist Party) or, indeed, and more subtly, in the majoritarianism of refer-
enda, which entails, in her felicitous formulation, “bowing to the decision of the half plus 
one as if it were the decision of the whole” (Rosenblum 2008, 50). One might likewise 
think of the much-discussed phenomenon of “populism,” which, at least according to one 
 
1 This is of course not to suggest that other contributions (e.g., Bader 2014; Ebeling 2016; Landis 2018; 
Teorell 1999) are not relevant. I focus on the book-length treatments simply because they represent the 
most comprehensive and internally consistent efforts of re-establishing parties as a topic of political theory, 
being as they are the culmination of multiple years of research on the topic. 
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popular interpretation, is characterised by the view that “there can be no such thing as a 
legitimate opposition” and only one correct interpretation of the common good (Müller 
2014, 487). 
When did parties experience their first moments of appreciation, and what argu-
ments were put forward in their defence? Arguably the most important historical defender 
of parties – an author whose work is a central reference point in the work of virtually all 
other contemporary party theorists – is the conservative Whig philosopher and politician 
Edmund Burke. Burke is credited with being the first modern thinker to advance a dis-
tinctively positive conception of parties as “a body of men united for promoting by their 
joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are 
all agreed” (Burke [1770] 1998, 271). The point to note is that, in Burke’s view, parties 
are not merely expressions of private interests who aim to exercise power to advance their 
well-being and corrupt the common good, as many previous thinkers feared. They are 
associations based on a shared interpretation of what the common good requires. In mak-
ing this point, Burke in important ways rehabilitated the notion of party (an association 
that pursues the common good), distinguishing it from the notion of faction (an associa-
tion that pursues the self-interest of a few). While for a long time these two concepts were 
essentially treated as one, Burke provided good reasons to keep them separate, and to 
favour party over faction. 
Rosenblum shows that Burke had yet another argument in support of parties. Tar-
geting concerns with political instability arising from partisan conflict, Burke “recognized 
organized parties as a political development that might mitigate rather than aggravate the 
evils that lead to violent political strife” (Rosenblum 2008, 121). The point was to see 
them as “regular, institutional substitutes for private intrigue as well as open rebellion,” 
a “checking apparatus” that tames more unregulated, possibly anarchical forms of politi-
cal conflict by bringing it “into the frame of government,” regularising it and eventually 
bestowing legitimacy onto it (Rosenblum 2008, 121). This defence of parties, Rosenblum 
notes, “was both enormously innovative and modest,” breaking as it did with the received 
wisdoms of Burke’s time (Rosenblum 2008, 121). “Better debate in parliament than kill 
each other on the street” was the basic idea. 
Burke’s first argument still has a controversial ring to it. After all, many contem-
porary writers keep conceptualising parties as agents that seek to promote narrow, fac-
tional interests instead of the good of the whole (a point Rosenblum demonstrates by 
reviewing standard conceptions of party in political science). One possible explanation 
for this is that much of the scholarly groundwork on which contemporary research builds 
goes back to the age of mass democracy, where even the staunchest defenders of parties 
(e.g., Hans Kelsen) have associated parties with the organised collective pursuit of group 
interests.  
This view no doubt carries a lot of plausibility: the first major parties that emerged 
as suffrage was gradually extended in the mid and late 19th century, were parties that 
sought to represent the interests and values of particular social groups, such as workers 
or Catholics. To say that these parties had no vision for the political community at large 
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would still seem reductive, however. Most of them certainly had such a vision, and hence 
also approximated a Burkean conception of party. Think, for example, of the innumerable 
debates around the proper nature of and political path towards a socialist society that took 
place between orthodox Marxists and social-democratic revisionists in the early Socialist 
or Social Democratic parties (Berman 2006). These debates were no doubt about the good 
of society at large. 
To the degree that these early parties, especially the Socialist ones, departed from 
their initial ambitions of violent revolutionary overthrow and accepted the liberal-demo-
cratic system of “regulated rivalry,” they also came closer to the distinctive ideal of par-
tisanship Rosenblum defends. The first component part of this ideal is, following Burke, 
the endorsement of regulated rivalry:  
 
“Partisans situate themselves in [a] system of political opposition. … That 
means at its most basic that [they] do not look to liquidate, erase, or per-
manently disorganize the opposition or represent them as public enemies. 
Partisans are not bent on mutual destruction. An opposition seen as mis-
taken, corrupt, unfair, or unjust does not rise to illegitimacy. It is not out-
lawed” (Rosenblum 2008, 363).  
 
All the while, partisans – whether in minority or majority position – “recognize that their 
standing is partial and temporary. That is, partisanship entails commitment to the provi-
sional nature of political authority, its periodic recreation” (Rosenblum 2008, 363). Par-
tisan victories, in Rosenblums view, are therefore never “final,” in the sense that political 
conflict ends when one has won an absolute majority of votes. Because partisans are 
aware of their “partiality,” they also accept iterative shifts in the vote distribution and, by 
extension, the possibility of losing. 
This points towards the second and most interesting component of Rosenblum’s 
normative account of partisanship: the dialectical relationship between advancing a po-
litical vision based on an interpretation of the common good, on the one hand, and the 
acknowledgment of one’s party’s partial standing, on the other. What does this mean ex-
actly? It means that while “partisans claim to be offering a satisfactory account of justice 
and what needs to be done for the nation as a whole,” and “want the opposition to be 
defeated (or enlightened),” they “do not want or expect the elimination of political lines 
of division. They do not claim that their party speaks for the whole. They are always 
partial, and however ardent and devoid of scepticism there is a limit and reticence to 
partisan claims. Even in power, they are not the nation” (Rosenblum 2008, 364). 
This recognition of partiality, notes Rosenblum, encapsulates nothing less than 
the “the categorical moral distinctiveness of party ID” (Rosenblum 2008, 364). Partisans 
(at their best) recognise that their standing is partial, if not for principled reasons – a deep 
commitment to the values of liberal democracy – then for prudential ones, i.e., facing the 
prospect of being in opposition at some point. Together with their promotion of particular 
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political visions for society as a whole, these [aspects] of partisanship “connect partisans 
intimately to the practices of representative democracy (Rosenblum 2008, 366):  
 
“Partisanship is avowed attachment, publicly enacted, to the form of po-
litical partiality and opposition characteristic of representative democracy. 
A distinctive political identity that is self-consciously partial and accepts 
its status as a part is significant, of course, because partisans alone among 
social groups are prepared for their own to assume responsibility for gov-
erning” (Rosenblum 2008, 366). 
 
The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age, the book of Rosenblum’s close collaborator 
(e.g., Muirhead and Rosenblum 2006) Russel Muirhead’s, is framed with an emphatic 
focus on the contemporary political challenges facing the U.S. Muirhead’s starting point, 
as indicated by his book’s title, is the rather extreme polarisation found between Demo-
crats and Republicans today. To quickly get a sense of the problem, consider that, in a 
recent survey, about 4 percent of the respondents from each party say that they view the 
opposition as “downright evil.” Even more strikingly, asked whether violence would be 
justified if the opposing party wins the 2020 presidential election, “18.3 percent of Dem-
ocrats and 13.8 percent of Republicans said violence would be justified on a scale ranging 
from ‘a little’ to ‘a lot’” (Edsall 2019). In light of this, it would hardly be surprising if 
Muirhead eventually resorted to a Burke-style defence of the ultimate importance of “reg-
ulated rivalry.” 
His book is much more ambitious than that, however. For Muirhead wants to both 
reconstruct an empirically-grounded ideal of partisanship and affirm the value, if not ne-
cessity, of “political contestation [that] reaches to fundamental questions about the defi-
nition of the community itself” (Muirhead 2014, 54). Let us begin with the ideal and then 
move on to the question of contestation. In sum, Muirhead’s ideal of partisanship com-
prises two elements. The first he calls loyalty, which involves both the “memory” of the 
accomplishments of the partisans of the past and “patience” concerning the gradual real-
isation of the parties’ aims and goals, which are inevitably long-term. The second element 
is the element of compromise, a quality that partisans should display both within their 
party and without it, i.e., both when deliberating with one’s fellow partisans and when 
debating with rival partisans. 
This ideal of partisanship expands on Rosenblum’s in that it puts special emphasis 
on the cross-temporal dimension of the practice (what Muirhead captures under the head-
ing of “loyalty”). Otherwise it captures very similar intuitions as Rosenblum’s, notably 
the recognition of partiality that (should) lead(s) to self-limitation. When it comes to the 
role of conflict in democratic politics, on the other hand, Muirhead conceptualises the 
tension between an ethical partisanship of compromise and agonistic modes of political 
contestation more radically than anyone else in the field. He does so by advancing a po-
sition that is avowedly sceptical of ideals of rationality and impartiality that are widely 
shared in political theory, and thought to be part of the political culture of developed 
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liberal-democratic societies. As he explains in chapter 2 of his book, in line with what he 
calls “traditional partisanship” we should welcome the fact that partisan conflicts are not 
merely about justice but about substantive conceptions of the good life, with all the af-
fective, identitarian and divisive baggage such conceptions typically come with. 
This view also leads Muirhead to argue that every political community – including 
liberal ones – is ultimately best conceived as a partisan community, meaning that we 
should regard even the most foundational values of a society as the outcome of partisan 
conflicts (rather than, say, universal moral truths that stand above ordinary politics) and, 
hence, as potentially open to contestation (68-76). Seemingly affirming Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde’s famous “dictum” that the liberal, secularized state lives by prerequisites, 
which it cannot itself guarantee, Muirhead indeed claims that the tendency of partisans to 
“to reengage foundational agreements by extending their application to a new age” (75) 
implies that these foundational agreements also do not define the boundaries of partisan-
ship. Just as partisanship is about substantial questions the good life, it is not necessarily 
constrained by what seem to be the nation’s basic creed. All the while, however, parti-
sanship ought still to instantiate the norms of loyalty and compromise that make it an 
admirable and valuable practice in the first place. 
One way of looking at Muirhead’s book is to see it as accepting that partisanship 
may permissibly be radical in aims and conflictual in its enactment so long as partisans 
in the end retain a basic “ethical” outlook that makes them inclined to compromise with 
their rivals. As he put it in an earlier article that formed the basis of the book:  
 
“[e]thical partisans … hope their side wins, yet know that victory should 
never be total. … The most admirable partisans are brave enough to stand 
up publicly for what they see, yet are capacious enough to know that what 
they see is not the whole of things. … Such partisans stand, but not un-
flinchingly. They would flinch – at the thought that one side would win a 
victory that might bring an end to partisanship itself” (Muirhead 2006, 
722).  
 
So just like in Rosenblum’s ideal of partisanship, Muirhead’s ethical partisans are also 
inclined to self-limitation and the recognition of one’s own partiality. Attractive though 
this sounds, one wonders to what extent a partisanship that challenges the fundamentals 
of a liberal society can be compatible with what ultimately sounds like a liberal commit-
ment to accept pluralism and engage in self-limitation when push comes to shove. 
What is interesting (and quite unique) about Muirhead’s book is that he not just 
argues for a particular interpretation of what partisanship “at its best” may look like, but 
also reflects in a systematic fashion on how U.S. partisanship can be reformed so as to 
overcome the current political impasse. Not only does he foreground concrete role-mod-
els of positive partisanship (e.g., Democratic Sen. Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts and 
Republican Sen. Alan Simpson of Wyoming), he also argues that if “more citizens, espe-
cially those currently drawn to an independent stance, [were to] become partisans” (148), 
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the effect would be the necessary moderation of partisanship. Put simply, he advises cur-
rently politically uncommitted Americans to enter partisan conflict for the sake of better 
politics. Finally, he advocates a “civic education for partisanship” (169) that should allow 
citizens to better understand “the ideologies that increasingly define them: liberalism and 
conservatism” (169), thus cultivating a capacity among citizens to be “capacious enough 
to know that what they see is not the whole of things.” In these ways, the “better” parti-
sanship that the U.S. so desperately needs should become feasible. 
 
 
A philosophical turn: White and Ypi, and Bonotti 
 
Jonathan White and Lea Ypi’s book The Meaning of Partisanship (2016) is much more 
philosophical in orientation, taking, as the authors note, a “theoretical turn.” White and 
Ypi’s main goal is to develop a general account of partisanship that “emphasizes princi-
pled constraints on partisan action” (155). By this, they mean that a desirable form of 
partisanship needs to be coupled with an account of political justification that grounds “a 
commitment to persuade others of their views through the appeal to reasons that can be 
generally shared” (3, emphasis added). Partisans, in other words, should advance their 
political demands “with the aim of demonstrating public appeal,” moving “beyond a par-
ticularist viewpoint” (61). In this way, they can contribute in important ways to “the ar-
ticulation and channeling of principled disagreements by rendering political projects vis-
ible and susceptible to comparison” (76), and thereby also contribute to “to identifying 
the general interest rather than undermining it” (48). Such partisanship is the opposite of 
mere power politics, and, in White and Ypi’s view, it is indispensable in democratic so-
cieties, where the exercise of power must be responsive to broader normative concerns of 
public justification in order to be considered legitimate. 
What is interesting about White and Ypi’s conception of partisanship is how much 
work they expect public reason constraints to do. It is straightforwardly plausible to de-
fend an adhesion to public reason norms as crucial for achieving compromises between 
partisans that are not just power-based bargains but more principled agreements on desir-
able goals that can jointly be pursued (ch. 7). It is much more controversial, on the other 
hand, to suggest that the kind of partisanship that seeks to publicise its view of the com-
mon good in generalisable terms is also compatible with firm political commitment that 
induces agents to refuse revising their political views even in the face of total political 
defeat (see ch. 4). Without denying the central role of political commitment in vibrant 
democratic societies, public justification is bound to become one-way communication 
when it involves presenting views that have been rejected by great numbers of people as 
instantiating generally shared values and principles (think e.g. of Soviet communism). 
Sometimes revising one’s political views may have independent value. 
Contrasting White and Ypi’s position with Muirhead’s argument is instructive to 
understand what is distinctive about it: while Muirhead appeals to certain partisan role 
models and emphasises the contribution of civic education in improving partisanship, 
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White and Ypi resort to an argument about a general moral duty to justify political claims 
in generalisable and reciprocal terms – perhaps the essence of the philosophy of public 
reason (for an overview, see Chambers 2010). It is in this sense that their book is more 
philosophical than the other contributions I discuss here: a certain familiarity with partic-
ular strands of post-Rawlsian political theory is certainly a pre-requisite for receiving 
their arguments as persuasive. This is not just true with respect to their arguments about 
public justification, but also in relation to their creative application of theories of associ-
ative obligations (ch. 5) and intergenerational justice to the political party (ch. 6). In the 
chapters on these topics, White and Ypi suggest that the idea of party makes sense only 
when we assume that those implicated in and committed to it are bound by moral obliga-
tions that extend over time: akin to what Muirhead refers to as “loyalty” (see above), 
partisans are said to have a moral duty to ensure that the achievements of the partisans of 
the past are sufficiently honoured, on the one hand, and that the principled spirit of the 
party is retained for future generations of like-minded partisans, on the other hand.  
A similar concern for the relationship between parties and democratic theories of 
public reason also animates Matteo Bonotti’s book Partisanship and Political Liberalism 
in Diverse Societies (2017). Bonotti’s aim is even more explicitly philosophical and the-
oretical than White and Ypi’s: he seeks to establish the place of parties in John Rawls’s 
influential philosophy of political liberalism, rescuing “Rawls’s theory from the wide-
spread accusation that it is inhospitable to real-world politics, and especially to party pol-
itics” (175). To achieve this goal, Bonotti works with admirable care and precision 
through the complexities inherent in the later Rawls’s understanding of public reason, as 
laid out in Political Liberalism (1993), suggesting that “there is in fact a correspondence 
between the demands of Rawls’s ideal of public reason and those of partisanship, when 
the latter is intended as a normative ideal” (63). After all, suggests Bonotti, “[p]resenting 
partial values and demands in a way that takes into account general ends and the common 
good … is the distinctive normative attribute of partisanship” (105). This might not seem 
like a surprising position to take if we consider how White and Ypi relate partisanship to 
public reason, but it is arguably not the popular view in contemporary analytic political 
theory. 
Like White and Ypi’s book, Bonotti’s touches on a wide range of normatively 
relevant issues, including religion in the public sphere, free speech, and electoral systems, 
skilfully discussing these themes in relation to Rawls’s canonical work and the topic of 
parties. All the while Bonotti operates with a quite heavily idealised normative conception 
of partisanship that is arguably rarely found in the “real world” in which he seeks to em-
bed Rawls’s philosophy. It is especially striking that Bonotti hardly acknowledges and 
explores the important tension between holding firm political commitments and public 
reason-associated norms of mutual listening and a disposition to compromise (see above), 
arguing instead that we should simply resist the “empiricization of the idea of the party” 
(105). This is a strange move given his intellectual ambition of bringing Rawls more into 
the “real world”: while idealisation obviously facilitates connecting different theories in 
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From partisanship to party 
 
What is notable about the four works reviewed above is their strong focus on partisanship 
as political practice, and the relative neglect of party as political institution. To be sure, 
the two things hang together in important ways. Partisans make up a party, so it might be 
said that if we aim to make partisanship better via generating action-guiding ideals, we 
will eventually also make parties better. Furthermore, it seems clear that the emphasis on 
partisanship (at the expense of party) makes a great deal of sense in the generally more 
U.S.-centred work of Rosenblum and Muirhead. Given the rather loose organisation of 
parties in the U.S., and given that perhaps most contemporary democratic problems are 
associated with hyperbolic partisanship among voters, putting the emphasis on partisan-
ship (not party) seems justified. 
 At the same time, however, the relative neglect of party that characterises the new 
political theory literature on parties, limits some of the theories’ ability to travel beyond 
the American politics-context, as well as theories’ capacity to speak to some of the most 
serious contemporary problems that plague party democracy. I think the latter point de-
serves special attention: for if the best party theories that are available do not squarely 
address some of the weightiest problems facing party democracy, then this at the very 
least calls for additional work that does address those problems (cf. Biezen and Saward 
2008). This is not to say that the above-summarised normative theories lose their appeal 
because they pay too little attention to party institutions. Yet, it seems clear that comple-
mentary research is needed that focuses on pressing institutional challenges that under-
mine the capacity of parties to serve their most important functions, and possibly even 
undercut the emergence of desirable forms of partisanship. In this section, I want to make 
the case for such complementary research and then review the main recent theoretical 
works that have studied parties in terms of political institutions. 
 
 
Institutional challenges: the rise of “cartel parties” and the crisis of party democ-
racy 
 
To begin, the institutional challenges I just alluded to arise from the long-term develop-
ment of party organisations in established democracies, and have repeatedly been identi-
fied as main drivers behind the contemporary crisis of party (and, by extension, repre-
sentative) democracy. They are problematised in one of the most influential empirical 
literatures in comparative politics scholarship on parties that charts the transformation of 
parties from “mass” to “catch-all” to “cartel” parties since the 1960s, with the latter model 
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being “proposed as a means of drawing attention to patterns of interparty collusion or 
cooperation as well as competition, and as a way of emphasizing the influence of the state 
on party development” (Katz and Mair 2009, 755; Mair 2013). 
Firstly, collusion and cooperation among major centre-left and centre-right parties 
has intensified as the post-war Keynesian growth regime transformed into a Hayekian 
one, and “the costs of providing public goods began to exceed the capacity of states to 
provide them” (Hopkin and Blyth 2019, 202). Under these conditions, many parties felt 
that they had “little choice but to become ‘responsible’ and make their peace with the 
capitalist class, while protecting themselves as best as they can from pressures to be ‘re-
sponsive’ to their members and voters” (Streeck 2014, 126; Mair 2013). This involved, 
first, a convergence of parties on the view that, whatever public goods states had produced 
in the past, the market could do it better. Think in this connection of ‘Third Way’ social 
democracy, which exchanged the ideology’s traditional commitment to a primacy of pol-
itics over markets with a seemingly pragmatic endorsement of the primacy of markets 
over politics (Jackson 2013, 360; Faucher-King and Le Galès 2010). This approximation 
of right-of-centre views limited the space of policy competition and made the latter in-
creasingly “focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity” (Katz and 
Mair 2009, 755). This is what Peter Mair (2013, 1) had in mind when he noted that today’s 
parties “pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer 
seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form.” 
Secondly, in line with a belief in markets parties also acquiesced to, if not actively 
promoted, the externalisation of policy commitments, meaning most importantly the de-
volution of monetary policy to independent central banks. The result, as Hopkin and Blyth 
(2019, 204) note, is the “equivalent of binding quotas over the quality as well as quantity 
of polices that a group of parties can produce” and has the effect that “politicians are no 
longer responsible for either creating or managing economic outcomes.” All of which 
enables them to be fiscally “responsible” instead of responsive to voters’ demands, whilst 
steering clear of being directly accountable for it. Within the European Monetary Union, 
the European Central Bank is widely thought to perform this depoliticising function; but 
it is far from the only unelected body constraining parties’ room for manoeuvre in the 
name of sound policy (see Bickerton et al. 2015). 
Thirdly, in addition to ideological convergence and an externalisation of policy 
commitments, the cartelisation of parties came with an increased consolidation of the 
position of the party’s professional arm at the expense of the (anyways decaying) partisan 
base. A key aspect of this is that parties have gradually obtained greater access to public 
funds, in order to solve the problem of not being able to generate sufficient funds through 
membership fees, and to reduce the “disparity of resources available to those in and out 
of government at any particular moment, in both respects by turning to the coffers of the 
state” (Katz and Mair 2009, 758). At the same time the remaining committed party activ-
ists have largely been disempowered, since they “are the ones most likely to make policy 
demands inconsistent with the ‘restraint of trade’ in policy that is implied by the cartel 
model” (Katz and Mair 2009, 759). Ironically, the means of disempowerment is often:  
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“the apparent democratization of the party through the introduction of such 
devices as postal ballots or mass membership meetings at which large 
numbers of marginally committed members or supporters – with their si-
lence, their lack of capacity for prior independent (of the leadership) or-
ganization, and their tendency to be oriented more toward particular lead-
ers rather than to underlying policies – can be expected to drown out the 
activists” (Katz and Mair 2009, 759). 
 
Especially in postal ballots or membership ballots more generally, participation is rather 
“atomistic” in the sense that “individuals are isolated from one another and engaged in 
direct communication only with the party centre, in a fashion that inhibits their ability to 
act in common with each other” (Carty 2013, 19). This provides the party leadership “with 
the ability to manipulate a formally popular decision-making process, by ensuring that 
members’ choices are constrained and limited to alternatives acceptable to the existing 
elite” (Carty 2013, 19). 
To be sure, several of the theoretical accounts of party I have reviewed in the 
previous section are aware of these developments and make (occasional) references to 
the cartel party-literature, often in connection with defending partisanship against possi-
ble empirical objections and showing that existing empirical trends do not disallow the 
proposed ideals (e.g. White and Ypi 2016, 68-74). Yet the major new party theories hardly 
engage more closely with the distinctively institutional challenges that the rise of “cartel 
parties” raise, in particular the consolidation of the quasi-oligarchical rule of party elites 
through the twin mechanisms of (1) exploiting public resources to the benefit of the pro-
fessionalised party organisation and (2) trying to “drown out the activists” who pose a 
potentially threat to the “restraints of trade” in policy through what are ultimately demo-
cratic means. But even more pertinently: it is unclear whether a theoretical ideal of par-
tisanship, however attractive, can provide a solution to these problems. For even if we 
assume that partisans act in line with such an ideal, many of them would be silenced and 




Institution-centred party theory 
 
In my own work (for a book-length treatment, see Wolkenstein, forthcoming; also see 
Wolkenstein 2016; Wolkenstein 2019a, Wolkenstein 2019b), I have tried to take espe-
cially seriously the challenges presented by party cartelisation. My argument is, first, that 
parties’ entrenchment via enhanced access to public resources (1) reinforces the case for 
investing our intellectual energies in theorising parties as institutions. For insofar as par-
ties have taken decisive steps to minimise the risks and costs of losing office, writing their 
own salary checks and devising their own legal environment more generally (Katz and 
Mair 2009, 756), they have become major gatekeepers of power whose central role in 
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organising the democratic political process cannot be ignored. New political actors, 
whether they choose to form a party themselves or not, will always be faced with an 
institutional environment that has been configured by older parties to make it difficult for 
others to challenge their power. To ignore this is to risk overlooking crucial power dy-
namics within contemporary representative democracies. 
Second, given existing attempts to drown out activists via democratic procedures, 
reflection must be brought to bear on which alternative, actually empowering, models of 
intra-party democracy there are or could be. This is because there is nothing in-principle 
wrong with the idea of democratising parties. On the one hand, norms of participation are 
generally diversifying and shifting towards more direct and deliberative forms of political 
participation, which generally calls for making political parties more participatory 
(Wolkenstein, forthcoming; Wolkenstein 2016; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein 
2017; Wolkenstein 2019a). On the other hand, the activist partisan base should have 
greater influence on political decisions because it is (as noted) a key force when it comes 
to resisting the dynamics of cartelisation by articulating competing political demands 
from the bottom up, and more generally the lifeblood of a vibrant and societally-rooted 
party. The crucial question then becomes: how should internal party organisation be or-
ganised?  
The answer I offer in my work – an optimistic one, to be sure – is that a delibera-
tive conception of intra-party democracy can go a long way in addressing the just-de-
scribed problems. By this I mean institutional designs that allow members to collectively 
deliberate over, question and criticise the proposals and decisions of party elites, as well 
as develop agendas and proposals of their own, rather than merely vote on proposals re-
ferred to them – or select candidates. What speaks for such a design is, first, that it can 
better unlock the critical potential of party activists than other forms of intra-party de-
mocracy: for in contrast to the potentially power-consolidating and status quo-reinforcing 
“postal ballots or mass membership meetings” many parties adopt (Katz and Mair 2009, 
759), deliberative designs put critical reflection and debate front and centre, creating an 
opening to move away from the status quo. 
Second, deliberative institutional designs are at once better aligned with the par-
ticipatory incentives of increasingly individualist and self-realisation seeking publics, 
since they allow people to voice their views and be heard individually (Invernizzi-Accetti 
and Wolkenstein 2017), and it helps overcome the aforementioned problem that “indi-
viduals are isolated from one another and engaged in direct communication only with the 
party centre, in a fashion that inhibits their ability to act in common with each other” 
(Carty 2013, 19), since they are directed at creating compromises on collective agendas, 
proposals or single decisions. Thirdly, deliberative institutional designs within parties 
luckily need not be invented from scratch, but can take inspiration from decades of re-
search on and experimentation with “democratic innovations” like deliberative mini-pub-
lics, participatory budgeting schemes, etc. (for an overview, see Smith 2009). In my work, 
I have suggested that parties can usefully draw on the knowledge available about such 
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institutions, implementing, for example, problem-oriented discussion fora that are initi-
ated by party members (for instance) with the aim of collectively devising a strategy for 
the party in a particular policy field without interference by party elites (Wolkenstein 
2016). One could imagine designing these devices with an adjacent obligation for elected 
representatives to act on the recommendations put forward by the party members, which 
would significantly strengthen bottom-up linkage within the party. 
There are many questions about the feasibility of such proposals, but I lack the 
space to go into this here. Suffice it to note that radical democratic transformations of 
parties seem possible even within long-established parties, as the recent reforms within 
the British Labour party show (Gerbaudo 2018). There is also a separate question whether 
such reforms are necessarily the best thing for a party or democracy at large; and there 
are certainly authors who, unlike myself, think that this is not the case. The argument that 
parties should resist internal democratisation has for instance been made by Frances Ros-
enbluth and Ian Shapiro in their provocative recent book Responsible Parties: Saving 
Democracy from Itself (2018), one of the few other recent contributions to the political 
theory of parties (though the book is framed more in terms of historical analysis than 
theory) that take the party qua institution seriously.  
Paying no heed to the somewhat established finding that trends of internally de-
mocratising parties and dispersing power in a decentralised fashion have been exercises 
in sham democracy that only serve to empower party elites, Rosenbluth and Shapiro argue 
that increasing party members and citizens “direct control of decisions and politicians” 
has proven “self-defeating for most voters” (Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018, 3), as it has 
led to the empowerment of “intense minorities” such as party activists who promote pol-
icies that most voters reject. Accordingly, Rosenbluth and Shapiro suggest that the radical 
opposite of internal party democratisation is more desirable: a party that is organised in a 
top-down fashion, with a strong leader who exercises firm control over MPs, who in turn 
form a disciplined and unified group that follows a common agenda and is unaffected by 
any kind of bottom-up pressures, be it from the wider membership or the citizenry as a 
whole. It is a “great paradox of politics,” write the two authors, that in order for parties 
to produce good public policy, they must not themselves be internally democratic. This 
may be at odds with voters’ participatory demands, and the general Zeitgeist of democra-
tising established politics – but it will satisfy voters on the long run in terms of policy. 
In Rosenbluth and Shapiro’s view, the political system that has been most suc-
cessful at maintaining the strong and responsible parties they regard as ideal is the British 
Westminster model (although they consider it now in decline because of decentralizing 
tendencies at the party level, notably in the Labour party after Jeremy Corbyn was elected 
as party leader). For decades if not centuries, they argue, Westminster has been structured 
around voter-benefitting competition between two large and disciplined parties. This is 
first because under Westminster, “any party seeking to gain or retain an electoral majority 
must present widely appealing policies”; secondly because “with only two parties in the 
game, political competition tends to be based on economic interests that are easy for vot-
ers to comprehend”; and thirdly because “single-member district systems create strong, 
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unified opposition parties that can hold the government to account” (Rosenbluth and 
Shapiro 2018, 71-73). For all its weaknesses, there is probably no better party system. 
And in the end, Britain is a “well-run country, judging from the government’s ability to 
implement policies with long-term benefits for most people most of the time over the long 
haul” (Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018, 62). Or so Rosenbluth and Shapiro suggest. 
The analysis comes with prescriptions. At a more general level, electoral systems 
around the world should be made more “British,” and one should by all means refrain 
from democratising parties internally. More specifically and interestingly, Rosenbluth 
and Shapiro make thought-provoking suggestions about how to re-draw electoral districts 
in Single Member District-systems in order to incentivise parties to make better policies. 
They argue for establishing “larger, more diverse electoral districts that include urban, 
suburban, and rural voters in roughly the same proportion as in the country as a whole,” 
for “When district residents have the same interests as the national median voter, internal 
party debates can focus on what is best for most rather than whose ox will gore someone 
else’s” (Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018, 239). 
Much as Rosenbluth and Shapiro deserve to be applauded for their efforts to come 
up with concrete institutional recommendations, it remains open to question whether their 
proposed reforms are a sound remedy for the pathologies of contemporary representative 
democracy. Not only does it remain unclear whether they have correctly diagnosed the 
problem in the first place (their claim that parties are over-democratised runs counter to 
plenty of evidence showing that intra-party democracy is usually designed and imple-
mented only to cement the power of the party elite, not to actually empower “intense 
minorities”). It is also highly doubtful that shaping electoral systems in such a way as to 
create more centrism is a plausible response to the ideological convergence of mainstream 
parties (see above) paired with greater polarisation on the fringes. For that would require 
that those who rebel against the mainstream – typically the supporters of “populist” par-
ties on the left and right – all of a sudden recognise that they profit from centrism, which 
seems like a highly unrealistic expectation.  
 
 
The party as revolutionary agent 
 
The final recent addition to the body of party theory literature, Jodi Dean’s Crowds and 
Party (2016), pulls in an altogether different direction, but also thinks of parties in terms 
of institutions or, perhaps even more accurately, collective agents. Dean’s political aims 
are diametrically opposed to Rosenbluth and Shapiro’s: instead of proposing reforms to 
party organisations in order to promote political centrism, Dean seeks to defend the party 
form as a potent vehicle of radical left-wing political protest and resistance to what she 
calls “communicative capitalism.” To “make a party of communists seem compelling to 
more of us again,” explains Dean, “I offer an approach to party inspired by the crowd. 
Faithful to the egalitarian rupture of the crowd event, the communist party holds open the 
gap through which the people,” understood as “a revolutionary alliance of the oppressed,” 
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“appear as the political subject” (Dean 2016, 28). The idea is to use the party as a way of 
empowering crowds, “the proletarianized many, those whose communicative engage-
ments are expropriated from them in processes of accumulation and dispossession that 
benefit capital as a class” (Dean 2016, 28), by allowing them to conceive themselves as 
the people.  
 In essence, Dean recommends the party as the antidote to the individualism of the 
“dominant ideology” of capitalist liberalism. “Capitalism,” she argues, “strives to sepa-
rate and individuate us, to instil in us the conviction that self-interest matters above all 
else, that freedom results from individual choices made for individual goals” (Dean 2016, 
260). And “When leftists assume the individualism of the dominant [capitalist] ideology, 
reiterating its emphases on uniqueness and trying to cultivate a politics out of individuated 
decisions, [they] undermine [their] own best impulses to collectivity and egalitarianism.” 
The political party, giving enduring shape to a collective political project, can allow the 
radical left to both overcome the politically debilitating implications of its internal frag-
mentation and to move from occasional moments of promise – as experienced in large-
scale protests like Occupy – to even greater mobilisation and the effective exercise of 
collective agency. It “enables the crowd to endure as a rupture with capitalism,” in Dean’s 
words (Dean 2016, 261), thus making possible what radical approaches to politics that 
reject the party form as overly institutionalist, insufficiently spontaneous or even poten-
tially repressive cannot achieve: to create a collective agent that is sufficiently durable to 
actually challenge existing structural power (this dovetails with Muirhead’s reflections 
on partisan loyalty; see above.) 
 And this leads to Dean’s major contribution: though she barely provides more 
concrete organisational recommendations, she manages to defend in a rigorous fashion 
the ultimate importance of parties to radical political projects. This contribution is im-
portant because the larger part of more radical political theorising is, as Dean rightly crit-
icises, too focused on non-institutionalised and spontaneous modes of political action. As 
I noted in the introduction, “phenomena such as civil disobedience, irregular and informal 
movements, … protests, insurgencies, street fighting, and illegal upheavals” (Kalyvas 
2008, 297) are often considered more important if not normatively superior to the more 
“normal” politics of partisan conflict. Yet the more enduring and coordinated forms of 
collective agency are arguably better-placed to affect lasting social change, and here party 
is indeed a promising place to search for organisational inspiration (cf. Gerbaudo 2018). 
In its own way, Dean’s proposal might also be seen as a response to the empirical chal-
lenges of party cartelisation I have described at the beginning of this section. For one, it 
seeks to show how radical alternatives to the status quo can become politically salient, 
against tendencies of policy convergence and the externalisation of policy commitments. 
And it is less concerned with designing ambitious party reforms – like the ones proposed 
by myself – than with preparing the revolution. Which, irrespective of whether one thinks 
it is desirable, might even be the more realistic approach to changing the status quo. 
 
 





“Across the West,” remarks one observer, “and in Europe in particular, we are witnessing 
a resurgence of the political party. Both old parties, like Labour in Britain, and new ones, 
like Podemos in Spain and France Insoumise, have experienced spectacular growth in 
recent years, while also undergoing important organizational innovations” (Gerbaudo 
2018). This is a good time for political theorists to study parties. Democratic theorists are 
especially well-placed to make better sense of the “spectacular growth” of some parties 
and the “organizational innovations” they experiment with, as well as propose useful in-
stitutional alternatives for parties that struggle politically. They can draw on multiple nor-
mative and empirical literatures that are concerned with understanding and improving 
democratic institutions, without necessarily being tied to a single empirical or theoretical 
paradigm (Biezen and Saward 2008). While it is critically important to keep an eye on 
practices of partisanship along the way, the most urgent questions of the day seem to be 
about institutional design. The first wave of party theory has established the ideal shape 
and democratic value of partisanship, it is now time to concentrate more on reforming or 
even reinventing the party as institution. To some, this might seem a hopeless task, given 
the tendencies described in the article’s second part; but such pessimism is misplaced in 
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